**References TSM Project**

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| 1. Hughes, M. M., Paxton, P., Clayton, A. B., & Zetterberg, P. (2019). Global gender quota adoption, implementation, and reform. Comparative Politics, 51(2), 219-238.   Quote: Whereas gender quotas existed in only a handful of countries in the 1970s, today more than 130 countries worldwide have modified constitutions, electoral laws, or party rules to mandate that a certain proportion of women be included as candidates or legislators.   * GQ among the widest electoral reform in the last 30 years * Focus on the conceptualization and measurement of gender quota overtime supaya bisa addressing diverse nature of quotas: Theorize and operationalize quota by time, size, type, feature, etcs * Mexico and Tunisia 50 percent of candidate quota, but the trajectory is differed. * Sanction for non-compliance has been shown to increase the impact of quota (p.223) * Quote: as our data show, the mere adoption of a quota by a country is not enough to ensure a significant increase in women’s representation over time (p.235). * More country not only adopt non-compliance sanction, but also along with placement rules  |  | | --- | |  | | 1. Jankowski, M., & Marcinkiewicz, K. (2019). Ineffective and counterproductive? The impact of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems. Politics & Gender, 15(1), 1-33.  * This paper is skeptical? about the effect quota in open-list PR system in Poland without placement mandate. List placement is important precondition for being elected in open-list PR system. * Female candidates benefit from quota because of better list placement (p.28). List placement is more relevant for winning than candidate’s gender (p.28) * Fig 1. Conditional election probability based on ballot position (p.16). Sama seperti pentingnya nomor urut * Bisa diterapkan untuk bagian discussion gw: Female = alpha + b1\* list.position + e & list.position = alpha + b1. Female + e * Introduction partnya menjelaskan bahwa efek dari open-list PR itu remain ambiguous. List-PR yang memungkinkan preferential votes might work against women, atau bisa juga menguntungkan. Ini berarti memang konteksnya kan!! (Cek kutipan beberapa artikel) * Introduction lanjut menjelaskan bahwa even when voters are not biased, women might be disadvantage because of their placement in the party list. (Cek kutipan beberapa artikel). Dan soal ini, ada yang tanpa placement mandate, ada yang dengan. Belgia one in two top position must be women. * Fokus paper: Menganalisis women after gender quota policy implemented in 2011 in Poland open-list PR without placement mandate. The results show quota increased female candidate at favorable ballot position and that the impact of quota on preferential votes (karena banyak perempuan, voters bingung dan kandidat perempuan overall rugi) is limited. * Paper ini juga menemukan bahwa without placement mandates in Poland, women placed at the top had higher chance of getting elected |  1. Yadav, P. (2023). Do political quotas work? Gender quotas and women’s political participation in Nepal. European Journal of Politics and Gender, 1(aop), 1-19.  * Artikel humaniora ttg pengaruh kuota gender di Nepal. Menggunakan perspective ‘capital’ dari Bourdieu. It argues that women yang join into politics due to quota berhasil meningkatkan their social, economic, and cultural standings * Quote: I have argued that political quotas not only accelerate women’s representation in politics, but also strengthen their position in society. They establish women’s credibility, pave the way for future generations and shift social perceptions around the presence of women in politics from being an exception to being an entitlement (p. 157).  1. Corrêa, D. S., & Chaves, V. S. (2020). Gender quotas and placement mandates in open and closed lists: similar effects, different mechanisms. Electoral Studies, 66, 102157.  * Super important: Placement mandates have similar effect in both closed list (mechanical effect) and open list (psychological effect) in increasing women representation. Bisa dipakai di discussion section gw soal the importance of ballot positions. * The effect of placement in closed-list has been well established, whereas in open-list it subjects to much scrutiny (p.9) * Schmidt (2009), placement mandates work even when controlling for list type (super artikel si Schmidt) * Quote buat paper: If placement mandates are implemented and women candidates are placed at the top of party lists, they begin to enjoy the same advantages that any other candidate would have in the same situation, due to voters’ patterns of behavior. (p.9) * Main argument: placement mandate enhances women representation in open-list PR due to psychological mechanism. * Baru tahu dari artikel ini kalo Argentian is the pioneer of quota in 1991 with 30 percent, followed by other countries and UN expansion in 1995. * Introduction part of this paper is super. It’s a must to emulate! Baca lagi dan lagi! * Quote: The main contribution of this article is to demonstrate that placement mandates promote women’s representation in open and closed-list PR systems with similar intensity, although by means of different mechanisms. * Besok baca style literature review-nya. * Literature reviewnya sangat masterful. Ada umum, spesifik, dan konteks Latin America langsung di masukkan. Mungkin gw juga bisa bikin spt itu, dan baru ada konteks kebijakan gender policy di pemilu dengan placement mandate but non-sanctions for non-compliance di bagian terpisah.  1. Jones, M. P. (2009). Gender quotas, electoral laws, and the election of women: Evidence from the Latin American vanguard. *Comparative political studies*, *42*(1), 56-81.  * Quote abstract: This study uses district-level data from national legislative elections in 19 Latin American countries to evaluate the effect of gender quota legislation, in concert with other electoral rules, on the election of women legislators. Well- designed quota legislation has a profound positive impact on the election of women, regardless of the type of party list (closed or open). Where quota legislation is in force, the use of closed lists on average results in a greater percentage of women legislators elected to office than does the use of open lists. However, this difference is not as great as would be expected based on the prevailing conventional wisdom and is primarily the consequence of the superiority of the closed-list systems when the number of seats a party wins in a district (party magnitude) is two. With one important exception, party magnitude is generally unrelated to women’s electoral success in the region. * Quote: Regardless of whether closed lists or open lists are used, the presence of well-designed quota legislation on average results in a significantly greater percentage of women legislators elected than where comparable quota legislation is absent (p.75) * Quote: In regard to the prevailing conventional wisdom that quotas work better with closed lists than with open lists when well-designed gender quota legislation is in force, the short answer is that the conventional wisdom is correct. On average a larger percentage of women are likely to be elected when, ceteris paribus, closed lists are used instead of open lists. However, the gap between these two systems is substantially smaller than one would expect based on this conventional wisdom.  1. Schmidt, G. D. (2008). The election of women in list PR systems: Testing the conventional wisdom. Electoral studies, 28(2), 190-203.  * Quote abstract: Certain institutional variables – closed lists, high district or party magnitudes, gender quotas, and placement mandates – are widely thought to facilitate the election of women in list PR systems, but this ‘‘conventional wisdom’’ has not been subject to a comprehensive, cross-national test. After reviewing the pertinent literature and highlighting potential interactions among these institutional variables, this article evaluates the election of women in virtually all democracies that rely primarily on list PR to elect the lower house or unicameral chamber of the national legislature, using an original data set and OLS regressions. The results provide strong evidence that contextual differences – rather than institutional factors – explain most of the variation. Among the institutional variables, only placement mandates clearly matter. Other institutional variables have only marginal impacts, at best, and these appear to diverge by ballot structure. The conclusion briefly addresses the practical implications of these findings. * Paper ini bisa jadi rujukan karena mengatakan bahwa the election of women in list Pr systems is largely due to contextual differences, rather than institutional factors. Dan dari institutional factor ini yang paling penting is only *placement mandates.* * GW setuju dengan contextual differences, tapi di paper ini variable contextual-nya adalah GNI per capita, left-vote share, dan Scandinavia. GW bisa bikin local context provinsi * Sementara my paper will argue even when placement mandate exists, perempuan tetap tidak meningkat. Jadi gw setuju dengan Schmidt (2008) bahwa gender quota itu bukan lebih tepat disebut intervening variable, daripada independent variable (p. 198). Unless it is designed toward placement mandate (p. 198). * “Conventional wisdom” on women representation: closed-list, high district magnitude, gender quota, and placement mandates. * This paper focuses on list PR.      1. Schwindt‐Bayer, L. A. (2009). Making quotas work: The effect of gender quota laws on the election of women. Legislative studies quarterly, 34(1), 5-28.  * Quote from abstract: Gender quota laws are intended to increase the number of women elected to legislatures, but initial evidence suggests that many laws have had little effect. I present a cross-national, statistical test that analyzes how three key dimensions of candidate quota laws affect women’s representation. My results show that quotas that require more women to be on party ballots lead to the election of more women, independent of placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms, but rules governing where female candidates are listed on the ballot and sanctions for noncompliance amplify that effect. Candidate quotas can increase women’s representation, but the quotas’ effectiveness depends on their design. * It is not simply having a quota but how the institution is designed that increases women’s representation (p. 22). * Tapi ini somewhat berlawaan dengan Schmidt (2008) yang mengatakan bahwa contextual factors yang penting, bukan institutional. Institutional hanya placement mandate buat Schmidt. * Sementara Schmidt-Bayer bilang, quota pasti akan meningkatkan representasi. Tapi efektifitasnya akan bergantung pada ada tidaknya placement mandates and enforcement mechanism. * Quote: Placement Mandate and Enforcement Mechanisms may only matter when interacted with one another and Quota Size (p.17). * Quote: Greater quota size leads to more women in the legislature independent of placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms, but the effect of Quota Size is indeed mediated by the other dimensions (p. 17).  |  | | --- | |  |  1. Wauters, B., Maddens, B., & Put, G. J. (2014). It takes time: The long-term effects of gender quota. Representation, 50(2), 143-159.  * Quote from abstract: We have estimated the changes in parties’ behaviour following the introduction of quota regulations in 10 Belgium. We expected to find a curvilinear effect: shortly after the introduction, women candidates would be worse off due to, amongst others, reluctance of the party elite to support women in the elec- toral contest. But after some time, their situation would improve—we hypothesize—either because parties become more convinced of women’s qualities or because of strategic considerations. Our results do show an initial setback followed by a modest increase, but this increase takes longer than we initially assume. * It’s written in the context of Belgium, So, at the beginning of quota implementation it’s lower, than it’s like a parabolic after awhile. But the authors are uncertain about the drivers of this increase: does it party’s true commitment of women or simply a strategic move from party?  1. Górecki, M. A., & Kukołowicz, P. (2014). Gender quotas, candidate background and the election of women: A paradox of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems. Electoral Studies, 36, 65-80.  * Bicara dalam konteks Poland, membandingkan pre-quota election (2007) dan post-quota election (2011). The ‘paradox’ here is that quota indeed increase the number of female candidates, but the overall performance were modest in the presence of quota policy – as can be seen in fewer elected women in Poland 2011’s election. * Quote from abstract: We study the effects of mandatory (legislated) gender quotas in Poland, a country utilising an open-list proportional representation electoral system. We use a unique data set comprising multiple characteristics of all candidates running in two consecutive elections to the lower chamber of the Polish parliament (the Sejm). The first of them (held in 2007) was the last pre-quota election and the second (held in 2011) the first post-quota one. We show that quotas have an inherently paradoxical nature: they cause a substantial increase in the number of female candidates, but the increase is accompanied by a sharp decline in women's electoral performance. This regularity holds even if we account for multiple indicators of candidate background, including previous political experience.  1. Htun, M. N., & Jones, M. P. (2002). Engendering the right to participate in decision-making: electoral quotas and women’s leadership in Latin America. In Gender and the politics of rights and democracy in Latin America (pp. 32-56). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.  * Quote from chapter: We develop two arguments about the effects of quotas on the election of women and on gender-related policy outcomes. First, we show that quota laws have been only mildly effective in increasing women's presence in legislatures. Many of Latin America's electoral systems make it hard to apply a women's quota, and political parties tend to comply with quotas in a minimalist manner. Data from the most recent round of elections show that, on average, quotas helped to boost women's presence in national congresses by five percentage points. Next, we present preliminary evidence suggesting that when quotas work, women's greater presence in politics serves to shift the terms of legislative debates. Yet quotas alone do not generate the political alliances necessary to change policy. * Bicara dalam konteks Amerika Latin dan ditulis di tahun 2002, dimasa kurang lebih satu dekade dari Argentina 1991. How did it change thus far after 20 years of this article written?  1. Carrión-Yaguana, V., Carrington, S. J., & Velástegui Moya, G. (2023). Female candidate performance and gender quotas: The case of Ecuador. Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, 44(2), 152-167.  * Menjelaskan performa elected women in the context of Equador * The main explanation rests on two points: voter’s bias and elite bias * Male voters have bias towards female candidates, they are less to vote for female. * Whereas elite bias has to do with putting women in non-first position on the ballot. (nomor urut) * Yang bisa ditiru di bagian discussion gw: model 1 (all voters), model 2 (female voters), model 3 (male voters). Di gw bisa jadi ‘male candidates’ to see if ada bias towards ‘female and male candidates’ on quota compliance  |  | | --- | |  |  1. O’brien, D. Z., & Rickne, J. (2016). Gender quotas and women's political leadership. American Political Science Review, 110(1), 112-126.  * Style: Our analysis focuses on a case study that offers a novel estimation strategy and compelling data. * Discussing the effect of quota as stated in the literature ‘acceleration effect’ and ‘trade-off effect’: the former has to do with how quota bisa meningkatkan representasi soon after its implementation, the latter has to do with orang bisa penalize perempuan not having a full authority due to this affirmative policy. * Quote p. 124: Opponents suggest that the fast-track approach to increasing women’s representation will undermine the very aims it seeks to achieve. By forcing parties to alter their “meritocratic” candidate selection policies, they argue that quotas will bring undeserving women into elected office. * The authors operationalize these two effects into: The selection of women in leadership position (acceleration) and the reappointment/survival of women in leadership positions. * Yang bisa ditiru: How gw mem-frame paper dalam konteks ‘compliance effect’ – null findings. Refute the literature tentang ini. Dan masterfully discussing the effect of quota by discussing Htun and Jones, Schmidt, Jones, etcs * The main results of this paper: Quota have a strong effect on female leaders selection (acceleration), but less so for female leader survival (reappointment/survival) * Findings: We find that an exogenously assigned gender quota had a positive impact on women’s ascension to leadership posts within political parties, but no influence (either positive or negative) on the average reappointment rate of incumbent female leaders. Our results generally support the notion of quotas’ acceleration effects, while rejecting the idea of a trade-off effect (p. 124)  1. Clayton, A. (2021). How do electoral gender quotas affect policy? Annual Review of Political Science, 24, 235-252.  * Artikel annual review: Relevant for my paper: the substantive effect of quota on policy * Relevant frame gw: subnational analysis of gender quota! * Quote p.236: Whereas quota policies were relatively rare before the 1990s, today more than 130 countries have modified constitutions, electoral laws, or party rules to require that women be included as candidates or legislators (Hughes et al. 2019, p. 219). * Quote: Much less is known about subnational quota (p. 237) * Quote: Analyzing countries during the peak period of quota adoptions from 1995 to 2012, Clayton & Zetterberg (2018, p. 922) find that, on average, women’s representation moved from 11% of parliamentary seats in the year prior to the quota’s implementation to 21% the following year. * Quote p. 238: Not surprisingly, countries with the highest representation of women in national parliaments often have parity quotas in PR systems (e.g., Bolivia, South Africa, and Norway). * STRUCTURE OF PAPER: Introduction, what is gender quota, when quota affects policy, what policy areas are likely to affect, how do quota affect policy (two factors: quota provide cues to legislators, and quota add more women in parliament, third – the null results of quota on policy outcomes), moderating effect of quota (quality of democracy, quota design and implementation, parliamentary culture), conclusion – THIS PAPER IS VERY FEASIBLE FOR ME * This professor is the big name in the literature. Must cited prof. Other than Paxton, Hughes, Krook, Jones, dan Schmidt  1. Clayton, A., & Zetterberg, P. (2018). Quota shocks: Electoral gender quotas and government spending priorities worldwide. The Journal of Politics, 80(3), 916-932.  * Quote from abstract: The rapid expansion of electoral gender quotas in the past few decades has been met with considerable scholarly and public attention. Despite this, there has been little empirical work examining the global legislative consequences of gender quotas over time. Developing a unique time-series cross-sectional dataset from 139 states during the peak period of quota adoption and implementation (1995 - 2012), we test whether and how quotas are associated with subsequent changes in government spending priorities. We find that substantial quota shocks - those associated with a large increase in women's parliamentary representation - are followed by increased government expenditures towards public health. Further, we find that increases in health spending are offset by relative decreases in military spending and other spending categories. Our findings provide strong evidence that quota policies influence government priorities in historically feminized policy areas, but principally when they are complied with and have substantial numerical consequences. * Intinya, quota memberikan sinyal ttg shifting priority in parliament. Isu kesehatan menjadi penting as to the higher spending. This relates to the substantive effect of quota policy * Two mechanisms of their theory of how quota affects government spending: 1) quota sends specific policy-generated ques to office holders, prompting changing legislative behaviors, and 2) by bringing more women in parliament, it alters gender compositions, which may affect budgetary priorities.  1. Paxton, P., & Hughes, M. M. (2015). The increasing effectiveness of national gender quotas, 1990–2010. Legislative studies quarterly, 40(3), 331-362.  * Quote from abstract: National gender quotas—policies that require a certain percentage of women candidates or legislators—are becoming more effective over time. Using data on 145 countries from 1990 to 2010, we document this trend with latent growth-curve models. Part of the explanation for increasing effectiveness is that countries have ratcheted up targets for women’s inclusion and that quotas are increasingly written in ways that make them more effective at achieving stated goals. Activists, political elites, and policy makers have learned over time which quota policies are most effective, resulting in quotas with provisions that more often lead to success. But, changes in rules alone do not account for the increasing effectiveness of quotas over time. It appears that changing norms about women’s incorporation in politics are also increasing quota effectiveness regardless of policy design * So the article says that kuota semakin effektif over time 1990-2010, karena ada-nya provisi tambahan (enforcement and placement mandates) dan adanya changing norms about women’s involvement in politics). * Jadi ini artikel optimis dalam melihat efekt kuota, sementara gw nggak – nul findings. * Existing studies is overwhelmingly national * Jadi studi ini menggunakan data panel melihat efektifitas kuota over time, sama dengan Clayton & Zetterberg (2018) yang melihat substantive effect on policy change * Quote. p.354: Looking at all types of quotas combined, we see that quotas at the end of the period are twice as effective as quotas at the beginning of the period. Overall, quotas have become an increasingly powerful mechanism for transforming the gender composition of national legislatures. * What explains the increasing effect of quota: placement mandates and sanctions for non-compliance |
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